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ADDITIVE HABITS WITH POWER UTILITY: ESTIMATES,
ASYMPTOTICS AND EQUILIBRIUM
ROMAN MURAVIEV
DEPARTMENT OF MATHEMATICS AND RISKLAB
ETH ZURICH
Abstract. We consider a power utility maximization problem with additive
habits in a framework of discrete-time markets and random endowments. For
certain classes of incomplete markets, we establish estimates for the optimal
consumption stream in terms of the aggregate state price density, investi-
gate the asymptotic behavior of the propensity to consume (ratio of the con-
sumption to the wealth), as the initial endowment tends to infinity, and show
that the limit is the corresponding quantity in an artificial market. For com-
plete markets, we concentrate on proving the existence of an Arrow-Debreu
equilibrium in an economy inhabited by heterogeneous individuals who differ
with respect to their risk-aversion coefficient, impatience rate and endowments
stream, but possess the same degree of habit-formation. Finally, in a represen-
tative agent equilibrium, we compute explicitly the price of a zero coupon bond
and the Lucas tree equity, and study its dependence on the habit-formation
parameter.
1. Introduction
The classical problem of an investor optimizing his preference functional by se-
lecting a suitable consumption plan constitutes a significant topic in financial eco-
nomics and mathematical finance. Since its origins dating back to the seminal work
of Merton [20], the problem has attracted the attention of numerous researches (see
e.g. [10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 22]), causing a prominent progress in the development
of novel mathematical tools, and an establishment of complex models which in
particular aim to appropriately explain important empirical observations.
One such modeling issue, which is a central ingredient in the current manuscript,
is the habit-formation utility paradigm. In contrast to standard time-separable
utility functions, habit preferences enjoy certain properties which are beneficial
from an economic and psychological viewpoint. Namely, in this model, the past
consumption patterns of an individual carry an impact on his current policy. The
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intuition behind this model is based on the postulation that decision makers who
consume portions of their wealth over time are supposed to develop habits, which
will have a firm impact on their subsequent consumption behavior. In particular,
the relative desire to consume may be increased if one has become accustomed to
high levels of consumption. A vast range of works are devoted to the study of
various aspects of the habit-forming utility maximization problem (see [1, 2, 3, 4,
7, 8, 9, 11, 21]).
The present manuscript deals with an individual’s discrete-time power utility op-
timization problem with additive habits. At each period, the current consumption
choice is subtracted from a benchmark parameter, which is commonly referred to
in the literature as the standard of living index, and is equal to a weighted average
of the past consumption stream. Due to the fact that power utility functions are
defined on the set of non-negative real numbers, the individual is forced to consume
in an addictive manner, since he is not permitted to consume below the benchmark
level.
The article can be categorized into two parts, which can be read independently.
In the first part (Sections 3 and 4), various classes of incomplete markets are consid-
ered: arbitrary incomplete markets with a deterministic interest rate, idiosyncrat-
ically incomplete markets (see Definition 2.2) and markets of type C (introduced
in Malamud and Trubowitz [17], see Definition 2.1). By exploiting the character-
ization of the solution of the habit-forming maximization problem in the setting
of the preceding markets, which was developed in Muraviev [21], we provide es-
timates for the optimal consumption stream in terms of the aggregate state price
density. Furthermore, we investigate the asymptotic behavior of the ratio of the
optimal consumption policy to the wealth (propensity to consume), as the initial
endowment tends to infinity, show that the corresponding limit is equal to the
propensity to consume in an artificial market, and derive the convergence rate in
the setting of some concrete markets. The second part (Section 5) is concerned with
a complete market Arrow-Debreu equilibrium. We first provide explicit formulas
for the so-called representative agent models, that is, a homogeneous economy. We
then derive the price of a zero coupon bond and the Lucas tree equity, and prove
that these prices are increasing convex functions of the habit-formation coefficient.
Secondly, we analyze and prove the existence of an equilibrium for a finite set of
heterogeneous individuals that have distinct risk-aversion coefficients, impatience
rates and endowments, but coincide in the degree of their habits. The reader is
addressed to [5, 6, 8, 12, 16] for an equilibrium related literature.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce all the essential
notions and the introductory results. Section 3 is devoted to the derivation of
estimates for the optimal consumption stream. In section 4, we investigate the
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asymptotic behavior of the optimal consumption. Section 5 concludes the paper
with the analysis of an Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.
2. Setup and Preliminaries
The setup coincides with the one in Muraviev [21]. We briefly depict the main
concepts of the model. There are T+1 periods. Uncertainty is characterized by a fi-
nite probability space (Ω,G, P ) and a filtration G0 := {∅,Ω} ⊆ G1 ⊆ .... ⊆ GT := G.
We set L2 (Gk), k = 0, ..., T, to be the finite-dimensional space of all Gk mea-
surable random variables, endowed with the inner product 〈X,Y 〉 := E [XY ],
for X,Y ∈ L2 (Gk) . We set further R+ := [0,∞), R++ := (0,∞), L
2
+ (Gk) :={
X ∈ L2 (Gk)
∣∣X ≥ 0} and L2++ (Gk) := {X ∈ L2 (Gk) ∣∣X > 0}, k = 0, ..., T. Adapt-
edness of stochastic processes is always meant with respect to (Gk)k=0,...,T , unless
otherwise stated. We consider arbitrary incomplete no-arbitrage financial markets
consisting of N risky securities and one risk-less bond. The price process of each
risky asset i = 1, ..., N is a positive adapted process
(
Sik
)
k=0,...,T
. Each security
i = 1, ..., N pays a dividend in the next period. The corresponding divided process
is non-negative, adapted and labeled by
(
dik
)
k=1,...,T
. The interest rate process
(rk)k=1,...,T representing the risk-less bond is predictable and non-negative. The
payoff space (at each period k = 1, ..., T ) is defined by
Lk :=
{
πk−10 (1 + rk) +
N∑
i=1
πk−1i
(
Sik + d
i
k
) ∣∣πk−1i ∈ L2 (Gk−1) , i = 0, ..., N
}
,
and L0 := {0}. Note that L2 (Gk−1) ⊆ Lk ⊆ L2 (Gk), for all k = 1, ..., T. We denote
by PLk : L
2 (GT )→ Lk, k = 1, ..., T, the orthogonal projection of the space L
2 (GT )
onto the subspace Lk. As shown in Lemma 2.5 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17],
there exists a unique (normalized) state price density (SPD) (Mk)k=0,...,T , which is
associated with the wealth spaces (Lk)k=1,...,T : M0 = 1,
(2.1) Sik−1Mk−1 = E
[(
Sik + d
i
k
)
Mk
∣∣Gk−1] ,
for all i = 1, ..., N ,
(2.2) Mk−1 = E
[
(1 + rk)Mk
∣∣Gk−1] ,
for all k = 1, ..., T , and Mk ∈ Lk, k = 1, ..., T. This process is referred to as the
aggregate SPD. Generally speaking, the aggregate SPD can take non-positive values
(see the discussion after Lemma 2.5 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17]). For simplicity,
we consider only markets with a non-vanishing aggregate SPD. The decision maker
in our model is trading in the market and aiming to maximize his habit-forming
preference functional. The endowment stream (ǫk)k=0,...,T of the agent is non-
negative and adapted. A feasible consumption stream is a non-negative adapted
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process (ck)k=0,...,T of the form
(2.3) ck = ǫk +Wk − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
Wk+1
∣∣Gk] ,
where Wk ∈ Lk, k = 0, ..., T , and WT+1 = 0. Here, the processes (Wk)k=1,...,T and(
E
[
Mk+1
Mk
Wk+1
∣∣Gk])
k=0,...,T−1
can be interpreted as the wealth and investment of
the investor respectively. The corresponding utility maximization problem is:
(2.4) sup
(ck)k=0,...,T∈B
T∑
k=0
e−ρkE

(
ck −
∑k−1
l=0 β
(k)
l cl
)1−γ
1− γ
 ,
where B is the set of all feasible consumption policies (ck)k=0,...,T satisfying the
constraint ck ≥
∑k−1
l=0 β
(k)
l cl, for all k = 1, ..., T. The non-negative constants β
(k)
l ,
k = 0, ..., T, l = 0, ..., k−1, measure the impact of the habit-formation affect on the
individual. The constants ρ and γ are viewed as the impatience and risk-aversion
coefficients respectively. Theorem 2.3 in Muraviev [21] guarantees that there exists
a unique strictly positive optimal consumption stream (c∗k)k=0,...,T solving to the
optimization problem (2.4). We denote by
M˜k = Mk +
T∑
l=k+1
l−k∑
j=1
∑
k≤sj<...<s1<l
β(l)s1 β
(s1)
s2 ...β
(sj)
k E
[
Ml
∣∣Gk] ,
for k = 0, ..., T , the perturbed aggregate SPD. We introduce now the following classes
of financial markets.
Definition 2.1 (Malamud and Trubowitz [17]). An incomplete market is said to
be of class C, if there exists an intermediate filtration (Hk)k=1,...,T such that
Gk−1 ⊆ Hk ⊆ Gk,
and P kL
[
·
]
= E
[
· |Ht
]
, for all k = 1, ..., T .
Definition 2.2. A financial market is called idiosyncratically incomplete, if there
exist two filtrations (Fk)k=0,...,T and (Gk)k=0,...,T such that:
(i) F0 = G0 = {∅,Ω}, and Fk ⊆ Gk, for all k = 1, ..., T.
(ii) The market is complete with respect to (Fk)k=0,...,T , and the endowment stream
(ǫk)k=0,...,T is adapted to (Gk)k=0,...,T .
(iii) For each k = 0, ..., T − 1, and an arbitrary random variable X ∈ L2 (Fk+1),
we have
E [X |Gk] = E [X |Fk] .
We now state the following results.
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Theorem 2.1. We have
(2.5) P kL
[
R∗k
R∗k−1
]
=
Mk
Mk−1
,
for k = 1, ..., T , where
R∗k := e
−ρk
c∗k − k−1∑
j=0
β
(k)
j c
∗
j
−γ− T∑
m=k+1
β
(m)
k e
−ρmE
c∗m − m−1∑
j=0
β
(m)
j c
∗
j
−γ ∣∣∣∣Gk
 ,
for k = 0, ..., T , is a positive SPD.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. See the proof of Theorem 2.3 in Muraviev [21]. 
The preceding statement admits a simplified form in the setting of some concrete
markets.
Theorem 2.2. For arbitrary incomplete markets with a deterministic interest rate,
or for idiosyncratically incomplete markets, we have
(2.6) PLk
(c∗k − k−1∑
l=0
β
(k)
l c
∗
l
)−γ = eρ M˜k
M˜k−1
(
c∗k−1 −
k−2∑
l=0
β
(k−1)
l c
∗
l
)−γ
,
for all k = 1, ..., T.
Proof of Theorem 2.2. See the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Muraviev [21]. 
3. Estimates
In the present section we provide estimates for the optimal consumption stream
and wealth process in terms of the individual’s endowments, risk-aversion, impa-
tience rates, degree of habits and the aggregate SPD. We first set some notation and
then introduce an auxiliary lemma.
Definition 3.3. Let (Xk)k=1,...,T be an adapted process. The upper hedging price
of the process (Xk)k=1,...,T is defined as the minimal number X
u
0 ∈ R such that
there exists a wealth process Wk ∈ Lk, k = 1, ..., T, WT+1 = 0, which satisfies:
Wk − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
Wk+1
∣∣Gk] ≥ Xk,
for all k = 1, ..., T , and
E [M1W1] ≤ X
u
0 .
Lemma 3.1. Consider a market of type C. For an adapted process (Xk)k=1,...,T ,
set XuT := esssup
[
XT
∣∣HT ],
(3.1) Xuk := esssup
[
Xk + E
[
Mk
Mk−1
Xuk+1
∣∣Gk] ∣∣Hk] ,
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for all k = 1, ..., T − 1, and
(3.2) Xu0 := E [M1X
u
1 ] .
Then, Xu0 is the upper hedging price of the process (Xk)k=1,...,T . The process
(Xuk )k=0,...,T is referred to as the upper hedging wealth process.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. See the proof of Proposition 2.17 in Malamud, Trubowitz
and Wu¨thrich [18]. 
We provide below estimates for the optimal consumption stream.
Theorem 3.3. Let (ĉk)k=0,...,T and (Ŵk)k=1,...,T denote the optimal consumption
stream and wealth process respectively of an investor trading either in an idiosyn-
cratically incomplete market, or in a market of type C with a deterministic interest
rate (i.e., (rk)k=1,...,T are non-negative constants), and solving the utility maxi-
mization problem (2.4). Then, we have
(3.3)
(
(−ǫ)Uk + Ŵk
)
mk +
k−1∑
j=0
ξkj ĉj ≤ ĉk ≤
(
ǫUk + Ŵk
)
mk +
k−1∑
j=0
ξkj ĉj ,
for all k = 1, ..., T,
(3.4)
(
(−ǫ)U0 + ǫ0
)
m0 ≤ ĉ0 ≤
(
ǫU0 + ǫ0
)
m0,
and
(3.5)
k−1∑
j=0
αkj ĉj − ǫ
U
k ≤ Ŵk ≤
k−1∑
j=0
αkj ĉj − (−ǫ)
U
k ,
for all k = 1, ..., T. Here, (ξnl )l=1,...,T ;n=0,...,l−1,(α
n
l )l=1,...,T ;n=0,...,l−1 and (ml)l=0,...,T
are given explicitly in (3.6), (3.9), (3.10), (3.13), (3.14), (3.16) and (3.17); the
upper hedging wealth processes (ǫUk )k=0,...,T and ((−ǫ)
U
k )k=0,...,T corresponding to
(ǫk)k=1,...,T and (−ǫk)k=1,...,T respectively, are given in Lemma 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The proof is by backward induction. First, observe
that by using (2.3) for k = T and the fact that ĉT ≥ 0, we get that (3.3) for k = T
is satisfied with
(3.6) mT := 1 ; ξ
T
j = 0,
for all j = 0, ..., T − 1, and
(3.7) ηT := essinf
[
ǫT
∣∣HT ] ; η′T := esssup [ǫT ∣∣HT ] .
An application of (3.3) for k = T on (2.6) yields
E
ŴT + esssup [ǫT ∣∣HT ]− T−1∑
j=0
β
(T )
j ĉj
−γ ∣∣HT

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≤
M˜T
M˜T−1
eρ
ĉT−1 − T−2∑
j=0
β
(T−1)
j ĉj
−γ
≤ E
ŴT + essinf [ǫT ∣∣HT ]− T−1∑
j=0
β
(T )
j ĉj
−γ ∣∣HT
 .
Since the expressions above within the the conditional expectations areHT −measurable,
we obtain
(3.8)
T−1∑
j=0
αTj ĉj + δT ≤ ŴT ≤
T−1∑
j=0
αTj ĉj + δ
′
T ,
with
(3.9) αTT−1 := e
−
ρ
γ
(
M˜T
M˜T−1
)−1/γ
+ β
(T )
T−1,
(3.10) αTj := β
(T )
j − β
(T−1)
j e
−
ρ
γ
(
M˜T
M˜T−1
)−1/γ
,
for j = 0, ..., T − 2, and
(3.11) δT := −esssup
[
ǫT
∣∣HT ] ; δ′T := −essinf [ǫT ∣∣HT ] .
Assume now that
k∑
j=0
αk+1j ĉj + δk+1 ≤ Ŵk+1 ≤
k∑
j=0
αk+1j ĉj + δ
′
k+1.
Recall that ĉk = ǫk + Ŵk − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
Ŵk+1
∣∣Gk], and thus we get
(3.12) ηk +mkŴk +
k−1∑
j=0
ξkj ĉj ≤ ĉk ≤ η
′
k +mkŴk +
k−1∑
j=0
ξkj ĉj ,
where
(3.13) mk :=
1
1 + E
[
αk+1k
Mk+1
Mk
∣∣Gk] ,
(3.14) ξkj :=
E
[
αk+1j
Mk+1
Mk
∣∣Gk]
1 + E
[
αk+1k
Mk+1
Mk
∣∣Gk] ,
for j = 0, ..., k − 1, and
η′k :=
esssup
[
ǫk − E
[
δk+1
Mk+1
Mk
∣∣Gk] ∣∣Hk]
1 + E
[
αk+1k
Mk+1
Mk
∣∣Gk] ; ηk :=
essinf
[
ǫk − E
[
δ′k+1
Mk+1
Mk
∣∣Gk] ∣∣Hk]
1 + E
[
αk+1k
Mk+1
Mk
∣∣Gk] ,
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for all k = 1, ..., T . Next, by combining (2.6) with the previous inequality, we obtainηk +mkŴk + k−1∑
j=0
(
ξkj − β
(k)
j
)
ĉj
−γ ≥
M˜k
M˜k−1
eρ
ĉk−1 − k−2∑
j=0
β
(k−1)
j ĉj
−γ ≥
η′k +mkŴk + k−1∑
j=0
(
ξkj − β
(k)
j
)
ĉj
−γ ,
this implies that
(3.15)
k−1∑
j=0
αkj ĉj + δk ≤ Ŵk ≤
k−1∑
j=0
αkj ĉj + δ
′
k,
where
(3.16) αkk−1 :=
(
M˜k
M˜k−1
)−1/γ
e−
ρ
γ + β
(k)
k−1 − ξ
k
k−1
mk
,
(3.17) αkj :=
β
(k)
j − β
(k−1)
j e
− ρ
γ
(
M˜k
M˜k−1
)−1/γ
− ξkj
mk
,
δk := −
η′k
mk
; δ′k := −
ηk
mk
,
for all k = 1, ..., T . Finally, we obtain the inequality
m0ǫ0 + η0 ≤ ĉ0 ≤ m0ǫ0 + η
′
0,
with m0 :=
1
1+E[α10M1]
, and
η0 := −
E [M1δ
′
1]
1 + E [α10M1]
; η′0 := −
E [M1δ1]
1 + E [α10M1]
.
One can verify that δk = −ǫUk and δ
′
k = (−ǫ)
U
k , for all k = 1, ..., T. This completes
the proof. 
The following statement is a simplified version of Theorem 3.3 for the case where
habits are not incorporated.
Corollary 3.1. Denote by (ck)k=0,...,T and (W k)k=1,...,T the optimal consumption
and wealth process of an individual trading in a market of type C and solving the
utility maximization problem (2.4) with no habits, i.e., β
(k)
l = 0, for all k = 1, ..., T
and l = 0, ..., k − 1. Then, under the notations of Theorem 3.3, the following is
satisfied
(3.18)
(
(−ǫ)Uk +W k
)
mk ≤ ck ≤
(
ǫUk +W k
)
mk,
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for all k = 1, ..., T,
(3.19)
(
(−ǫ)U0 + ǫ0
)
m0 ≤ c0 ≤
(
ǫU0 + ǫ0
)
m0,
and
(3.20) αkk−1ck−1 − ǫ
U
k ≤W k ≤ α
k
k−1ck−1 − (−ǫ)
U
k ,
for all k = 1, ..., T.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. The assertion follows immediately from Theorem 3.3
and Proposition 2.9 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] (which corresponds to Theorem
2.1 with no habits) . 
4. Asymptotics
Denote by (ck(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T and (Wk(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T the optimal
consumption stream and wealth process, respectively, solving the utility maximiza-
tion problem (2.4). Note that the scaling property of the power utility function
yields
(4.1)
ck(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT )
ǫ0
= ck
(
1,
ǫ1
ǫ0
, ...,
ǫT
ǫ0
)
,
for all k = 0, ..., T, and
(4.2)
Wk(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT )
ǫ0
= Wk
(
1,
ǫ1
ǫ0
, ...,
ǫT
ǫ0
)
,
for all k = 1, ..., T . In the current section, we let ǫ1, ..., ǫT be fixed, and study
the asymptotic behavior (as ǫ0 → ∞) of the quanteties (4.1) and (4.2), for vari-
ous models: incomplete markets with a positive aggregate SPD, incomplete mar-
kets with a deterministic interest rate and idiosyncratically incomplete markets.
For these cases, we show that the limits corresponding to (4.1) and (4.2) exist
and equal to ck(1, 0, ..., 0) and Wk(1, 0, ..., 0), respectively. Therefore, the problem
amounts to checking the continuity of the functions ck (1, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ) , k = 0, ..., T
and Wk (1, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ) , k = 1, ..., T at (1, 0, ..., 0).
4.1. Positive Aggregate SPD. First, we consider arbitrary incomplete finan-
cial markets with a positive aggregate SPD (Mk)k=0,...,T . In this setting, we
let (c∗k(ǫ0, ǫ1..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T and (W
∗
k (ǫ0, ǫ1..., ǫT ))k=1,...,T denote the correspond-
ing optimal consumption stream and wealth process respectively. We set further
c∗k = c
∗
k(1, 0..., 0), k = 0, ..., T , and W
∗
k = c
∗
k(1, 0..., 0), k = 1, ..., T . By Theorem 2.1
and identity (2.3), we have
(4.3) c∗k = W
∗
k − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
W ∗k+1
∣∣Gk] ; c∗0 = 1− E [M1W ∗1 ] ,
and
(4.4) P kL
[
R∗k
R∗k−1
]
=
Mk
Mk−1
,
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for all k = 1, ..., T , where
R∗k := e
−ρk
c∗k − k−1∑
j=0
β
(k)
j c
∗
j
−γ− T∑
m=k+1
e−ρmβ
(m)
k E
c∗m − m−1∑
j=0
β
(m)
j c
∗
j
−γ ∣∣∣∣Gk
 ,
for k = 0, ..., T .
We exhibit now the main result of the subsection.
Theorem 4.4. We have
(4.5) lim
ǫ0→∞
c∗k(ǫ0, ǫ1..., ǫT )
ǫ0
= c∗k,
P−a.s., for all k = 0, ..., T , and
(4.6) lim
ǫ0→∞
W ∗k (ǫ0, ǫ1..., ǫT )(ǫ0)
ǫ0
=W ∗k ,
P−a.s., for all k = 1, ..., T .
We first prove the following weaker result.
Lemma 4.2. We have
(4.7) lim sup
ǫ0→∞
c∗k(ǫ0, ǫ1..., ǫT )
ǫ0
<∞ ; lim inf
ǫ0→∞
c∗k(ǫ0, ǫ1..., ǫT )
ǫ0
> 0,
P−a.s, for all k = 0, ..., T − 1, and
(4.8) lim sup
ǫ0→∞
W ∗k (ǫ0, ǫ1..., ǫT )
ǫ0
<∞ ; lim inf
ǫ0→∞
W ∗k (ǫ0, ǫ1..., ǫT )
ǫ0
> 0,
P−a.s, for all k = 1, ..., T .
Proof of Lemma 4.2. To simplify notations (ǫ1, ..., ǫT are fixed), we de-
note ck(ǫ0) := c
∗
k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ), k = 0, ..., T , and Wk(ǫ0) := W
∗
k (ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ), k =
1, ..., T . First, let us show that lim infǫ0→∞
W1(ǫ0)
ǫ0
≥ 0, P−a.s. Assume that there
exists some constant a1 < 0 such that P
(
lim infǫ0→∞
W1(ǫ0)
ǫ0
< a1
)
> 0. Then, since
the optimal consumption stream and (Mk)k=0,...,T are positive, and c1(ǫ0) = ǫ1 +
W1(ǫ0)−E
[
M2
M1
W2(ǫ0)
∣∣G1] > 0, it follows that P (lim infǫ0→∞ W2(ǫ0)ǫ0 < a2) > 0, for
some a2 < 0. Continuing inductively, we obtain that P
(
lim infǫ0→∞
WT (ǫ0)
ǫ0
< aT
)
>
0, for some constant aT < 0. This is a contradiction since cT (ǫ0) is positive and
ct(ǫ0) = ǫT +WT (ǫ0). In the same way, one checks that lim infǫ0→∞
Wk(ǫ0)
ǫ0
≥ 0,
P−a.s, k = 1, ..., T. We treat the upper limits now. We have lim supǫ0→∞E
[
M1×
W1(ǫ0)
ǫ0
]
= lim supǫ0→∞
(
1− c0(ǫ0)ǫ0
)
≤ 1. Since M1 is a positive random vari-
able, it follows that lim supǫ0→∞
W1(ǫ0)
ǫ0
< ∞, P−a.s. The identity ck(ǫ0)ǫ0 =
ǫk
ǫ0
+
Wk
ǫ0
− E
[
Mk+1
Mk
Wk+1(ǫ0)
ǫ0
∣∣Gk] , for k = 1, ..., T , the fact that lim infǫ0→∞ Wk(ǫ0)ǫ0 ≥ 0,
P−a.s, k = 1, ..., T, and the positivity of the process (Mk)k=0,...,T conclude the
proof for the upper limits. Next, we treat the lower limits. First, we claim that
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lim infǫ0→∞
c1(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
> β
(1)
0 . Assume on the contrary that this is not the case, and
multiply the first order condition (2.5) for k = 1 by cγ0 (ǫ0):
P 1L
(c1(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
− β10
)−γ
−
T∑
j=2
β
(j)
1 E
( cj(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
−
j−1∑
l=0
β
(j)
l
cl(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
)−γ ∣∣∣∣G1
 =
eρM1
1− T∑
j=1
β
(j)
0 E
( cj(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
−
j−1∑
l=0
β
(j)
l
cl(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
)−γ .
By Theorem 2.1 (recall that (R∗)k=0,...,T is a positive SPD), we have
0 ≤
T∑
j=1
β
(j)
0 E
( cj(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
−
j−1∑
l=0
β
(j)
l
cl(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
)−γ < 1.
Therefore, we get a contradiction by applying an expectation on both sides of the
equation, and observing that
lim sup
ǫ0→∞
E
(c1(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
− β10
)−γ
−
T∑
j=2
β
(j)
1 E
( cj(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
−
j−1∑
l=0
β
(j)
l
cl(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
)−γ ∣∣∣∣G1
 =∞,
whereas the right hand side is bounded. In the same manner, one checks that
(4.9) lim inf
ǫ0→∞
ck(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
> αk,
for all k = 1, ..., T , where
(4.10) αk :=
k−1∑
l=0
∏
l≥ik>...>i1>0
β
(k)
l β
(l)
ik
...β
(i1)
0 ≥ 0.
Recall now that cT (ǫ0) = ǫT +WT (ǫ0), hence
lim inf
ǫ0→∞
WT (ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
= lim inf
ǫ0→∞
cT (ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
> αT ,
P−a.s. By (2.3) for k = T − 1, we get
cT−1(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
=
ǫT−1
c0(ǫ0)
+
WT−1(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
− E
[
MT
MT−1
WT (ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
|GT−1
]
,
P−a.s., and we conclude that
lim inf
ǫ0→∞
WT−1(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
> αTE
[
MT
MT−1
∣∣GT−1]− lim sup
ǫ0→∞
ǫT−1
c0(ǫ0)
,
P−a.s. In the same manner, one can verify that
(4.11) lim inf
ǫ0→∞
Wk(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
> − lim sup
ǫ0→∞
∑T−1
j=k ǫj
c0(ǫ0)
+ αTE
[
MT
Mk
∣∣Gk] ,
P−a.s., for all k = 1, ..., T−1.Now, assume on the contrary that lim infǫ0→∞
c0(ǫ0)
ǫ0
=
0. Observe that we can rewrite (2.3) for k = 0 as
1 =
ǫ0
c0(ǫ0)
− E
[
M1
W1 (ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
]
,
12 R. Muraviev
hence (since lim supǫ0→∞
W1(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
< ∞), we get a contradiction. In particular,
limǫ0→∞ c0(ǫ0) = ∞, and thus inequality (4.11) becomes lim infǫ0→∞
Wk(ǫ0)
c0(ǫ0)
>
αTE
[
MT
Mk
∣∣Gk] , P−a.s., for all k = 1, ..., T. The proof is now accomplished by not-
ing that the preceding observations applied on (4.9) and (4.11) yield
lim inf
ǫ0→∞
ck(ǫ0)
ǫ0
> αk lim inf
ǫ0→∞
c0(ǫ0)
ǫ0
≥ 0,
and
lim inf
ǫ0→∞
Wk(ǫ0)
ǫ0
> αTE
[
MT
Mk
∣∣Gk] lim inf
ǫ0→∞
c0(ǫ0)
ǫ0
≥ 0,
P−a.s., for all k = 1, ..., T. 
Corollary 4.2. We have
lim
ǫ0→∞
ck(ǫ0) =∞,
P−a.s., for all k = 0, ..., T, and
lim
ǫ0→∞
Wk(ǫ0) =∞,
P−a.s., for all k = 1, ..., T . 
Proof of Corollary 4.2. The assertion follows from the lower limits established
in Lemma 4.2. 
We are now ready to prove the main result of the subsection.
Proof of Theorem 4.4. By Lemma 4.2, there exist two sequences (ǫn1 )n∈N and
(ǫn2 )n∈N of real numbers tending to +∞ such that limn→∞
ck(ǫ
n
i )
ǫn
i
= c
(i)
k , P−a.s.,
for k = 0, ..., T, and limn→∞
Wk(ǫ
n
i )
ǫn
i
= W
(i)
k , P−a.s., for k = 1, ..., T , and i = 1, 2,
where 0 < c
(i)
k <∞, P−a.s., for all k = 0, ..., T , and 0 < W
(i)
k <∞, P−a.s., for all
k = 1, ..., T , and i = 1, 2. Now, by multiplying equations (2.5) and (2.3) by (ǫni )
γ
and (ǫni )
−1 respectively, and then letting n→∞, we obtain the following identities:
P kL
[
Rik
]
=
Mk+1
Mk
Rik−1,
for all k = 0, ..., T − 1, i = 1, 2, where
Rik := e
−ρk
cik − k−1∑
j=0
β
(k)
j c
i
j
−γ− T∑
m=k+1
β
(m)
k E
cim − m−1∑
j=0
e−ρmβ
(m)
j c
i
j
−γ ∣∣∣∣Gk
 ,
and
c
(i)
k = W
(i)
k − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
W
(i)
k+1
∣∣Gk]
for all k = 1, ..., T , i = 1, 2, and
c
(i)
0 = 1− E
[
M1W
(i)
1
]
,
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for i = 1, 2. Note that the above system of equations corresponds to the solution
of the utility maximization (2.4) with the endowments ǫ0 = 1 and ǫk = 0 for
all k = 1, ..., T (see (4.3) and (4.4)). Therefore, the uniqueness of the optimal
consumption stream and the wealth process implies that: limǫ0→∞
ck(ǫ0)
ǫ0
exists,
P−a.s., for each k = 0, ..., T ; limǫ0→∞
Wk(ǫ0)
ǫ0
exists, P−a.s., for each k = 1, ..., T ;
c
(1)
k = c
(2)
k = c
∗
k for all k = 0, ..., T, and W
(1)
k = W
(2)
k = W
∗
k for all k = 1, ..., T,
completing the proof of Theorem 4.4. 
4.2. Idiosyncratic Incompleteness and Deterministic Interest Rate. The
scaling property of the power utility function combined with Theorem 4.1 in Mu-
raviev [21] and Theorem 2.14 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] simplifies substan-
tially the analysis of the asymptotic behavior of the quantities (4.1) and (4.2), for id-
iosyncratically incomplete markets and markets of type C with habits, and arbitrary
incomplete markets with no habits. Furthermore, it allows us to establish the con-
vergence rates. Denote by (ĉk(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T and (Ŵk(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=1,...,T
((ck(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T and (W k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=1,...,T ) the optimal consumption
and wealth process respectively of an investor solving the utility maximization prob-
lem (2.4) in an incomplete market with a deterministic interest rate (idiosyncrat-
ically incomplete market). We set further ĉk := ĉk(1, 0, ..., 0), ck := ck(1, 0, ..., 0),
k = 0, ..., T, and Ŵk := Ŵk(1, 0, ..., 0), W k := W k(1, 0, ..., 0), k = 1, ..., T. By
Theorem 2.2, we have
(4.12) ĉk =
k−1∑
j=0
β
(k)
j ĉj +
(
M˜k
M˜k−1
)− 1
γ
ǫ−
ρ
γ ĉ0,
for all k = 1, ..., T,
(4.13) ĉ0 +
T∑
k=1
E
[
Mk
Mk−1
ĉk
]
= 1,
(4.14) Ŵk =
T∑
j=k
E
[
Mj
Mk
ĉj
∣∣Gk] ,
for all k = 1, ..., T, and
(4.15) ck = W k − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
W k+1
∣∣Gk] ; c0 = 1− E [M1W 1] ,
and
(4.16) P kL
ck − k−1∑
j=0
β
(k)
j cj
−γ = M˜k
M˜k−1
eρ
ck−1 − k−2∑
j=0
β
(k−1)
j cj
−γ ,
for all k = 1, ..., T .
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Theorem 4.5. The processes (ĉk(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T , (Ŵk(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=1,...,T ,
(ck(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T and (W k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=1,...,T are C
∞−differentiable with
respect to each variable ǫj , j = 1, ..., T . In particular, we have
(4.17)
∣∣∣∣ ĉk(ǫ0)ǫ0 − ĉk
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1ǫ0
)
,
(4.18)
∣∣∣∣ck(ǫ0)ǫ0 − ck
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1ǫ0
)
,
as ǫ0 →∞, P−a.s., for all k = 0, ..., T , and
(4.19)
∣∣∣∣∣Ŵk(ǫ0)ǫ0 − Ŵk
∣∣∣∣∣ = O
(
1
ǫ0
)
,
(4.20)
∣∣∣∣W k(ǫ0)ǫ0 −W k
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1ǫ0
)
,
as ǫ0 →∞, P−a.s., for all k = 1, ..., T .
Proof of Theorem 4.5. The differentiability follows the same ideas as those in
the proof of Theorem 4.1 in Muraviev [21], based on the implicit function theorem,
and thus is omitted. The rates of convergence follows directly from differentiability,
(4.1) and (4.2). 
Consider the utility maximization problem (2.4) with no habits, i.e., β
(k)
l = 0, k =
1, ..., T , l = 0, ..., k−1,. Let (c′k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T and (W
′
k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=1,...,T
denote the corresponding optimal consumption and investment processes respec-
tively. We set further c′k := c
′
k(1, 0..., 0), k = 0, ..., T and W
′
k := W
′
k(1, 0..., 0),
k = 1, ..., T. By Proposition 2.9 in Malamud and Trubowitz [17] (which coincides
with Theorem 2.1 with no habits), we have
P kL
[
(c′k)
−γ
]
= eρ
Mk
Mk−1
(
c′k−1
)−γ
,
c′k = W
′
k − E
[
Mk+1
Mk
W ′k+1
]
,
for k = 1, ..., T . If the market is of type C, we get
c′k = e
−
ρ
γ (Mk)
− 1
γ c′0,
W ′k =
T∑
j=k
E
[
Mj
Mk
c′k
∣∣Gk] .
for k = 1, ..., T, and
c′0 +
T∑
j=0
E [Mkc
′
k] = ǫ
′
0 +
T∑
j=0
E [Mkǫ
′
k] .
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Theorem 4.6. The processes (c′k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=0,...,T and (W
′
k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT ))k=1,...,T
are C∞−differentiable with respect to each ǫk, k = 1, ..., T. In particular, we have
(4.21)
∣∣∣∣c′k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT )ǫ0 − c′k
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1ǫ0
)
,
for all k = 0, ..., T, and
(4.22)
∣∣∣∣W ′k(ǫ0, ǫ1, ..., ǫT )ǫ0 −W ′k
∣∣∣∣ = O( 1ǫ0
)
.
Proof of Theorem 4.6. The assertion follows from Theorem 2.14 in Malamud
and Trubowitz [17]. 
5. Equilibrium
We consider throughout the section preferences with static type of habits that
are assigned according to a last period consumption. Namely, β
(k)
k−1 = β ≥ 0,
k = 1, ..., T , and β
(k)
j = 0, k = 1, ..., T, j = 0, ..., k− 2. Furthermore, we restrict our
analysis to complete markets, i.e., there exists a unique (normalized) positive SPD
(which coincides with the aggregate SPD) denoted by (Mk)k=0,...,T . We consider
an economy inhabited by N (types of) economic investors labeled by i = 1, ..., N.
In accordance with the above framework, each individual i solves the utility maxi-
mization problem:
(5.1) max
ci0,...,c
i
T
T∑
k=0
e−ρikE
[(
cik − βc
i
k−1
)1−γi
1− γi
]
,
where the consumption stream
(
cik
)
k=0,...,T
is a non-negative adapted process sat-
isfying the inequality cik ≥ βc
i
k−1, k = 1, ..., T, and the budget constraint
(5.2)
T∑
k=0
E
[
Mkc
i
k
]
=
T∑
k=0
E
[
Mkǫ
i
k
]
.
Due to the static structure of the habit-forming coefficients, and the fact that
the market is complete, the first order conditions (2.6) can be re-expressed in a
simplified form:
(5.3)
(
cik − βc
i
k−1
)−γ
= eρi
M˜k
M˜k−1
(
cik−1 − βc
i
k−2
)−γ
,
for all k = 1, ..., T, where, in the current setting, the perturbed (aggregate) SPD is
given by
(5.4) M˜k = Mk +
T−k∑
j=1
βjE
[
Mk+j
∣∣Gk] ,
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for all k = 0, ..., T. Therefore, the recursive relation M˜k = Mk + βE
[
M˜k+1
∣∣Gk] ,
k = 0, ..., T, yields
Mk = M˜k − βE
[
M˜k+1
∣∣Gk] ,
for all k = 1, ..., T, where M˜T+1 = 0.
Definition 5.4. An Arrow-Debreu equilibrium (or, equilibrium for short) is a pair
of processes (ck)k=0,...,T ;i=1,...,N , and (Mk)k=1,...,T such that:
(a) The process (Mk)k=1,...,T is a state price density, and (c
i
k)k=0,...,T is the optimal
consumption stream of each agent i solving the utility maximization problem (5.1)
in the corresponding market.
(b) The market clears
(5.5)
N∑
i=1
cik = ǫk :=
N∑
i=1
ǫik,
at each period k = 0, ..., T .
5.1. Homogeneous Economy. We consider now an economy which is populated
by an agent of one type, that is, N = 1. The risk-aversion, habit-formation pa-
rameter, impatience coefficient and endowments stream are denoted by γ, β, ρ and
(ǫk)k=0,...,T , respectively. The associated optimal consumption stream of the indi-
vidual is denoted by (ck)k=0,...,T .
Theorem 5.7. In a homogeneous economy, there exists an equilibrium if and only
if
(5.6) ǫk > βǫk−1,
and
(5.7) (ǫk−1 − βǫk−2)
−γ
> βe−ρE
[
(ǫk − βǫk−1)
−γ ∣∣Gk−1] ,
for all k = 1, ..., T, where ǫ−1 := 0. Furthermore, the corresponding equilibrium
SPD is unique and given by M0 = 1,
(5.8) Mk = e
−ρk
(ǫk − βǫk−1)
−γ − βe−ρE
[
(ǫk+1 − βǫk)
−γ ∣∣Gk]
ǫ−γ0 − βe
−ρE
[
(ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ
] ,
for all k = 1, ..., T − 1, and
(5.9) MT = e
−ρT (ǫT − βǫT−1)
−γ
ǫ−γ0 − βe
−ρE
[
(ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ
] .
Remark 5.1. A sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium is:
ǫk > βǫk−1 + β
1/γe−
ρ
γ (ǫk−1 − βǫk−2) ,
for all k = 1, ..., T.
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Proof of Theorem 5.7. We impose the market clearing condition ck = ǫk,
for all k = 0, ..., T , which in particular guarantees that budget constraint (5.2) is
satisfied. By (5.3) for k = 1, we have
(ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ
= eρ
M˜1
M˜0
ǫ−γ0 .
Recall that M˜0 = 1 + βE
[
M˜1
]
, hence
E
[
M˜1
]
=
e−ρE
[(
ǫ0
ǫ1−βǫ0
)γ]
1− βe−ρE
[(
ǫ0
ǫ1−βǫ0
)γ] ,
which yields
(5.10) M˜1 =
e−ρ (ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ
ǫ−γ0 − βe
−ρE
[
(ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ
] .
Next, by (5.3) for k = 2 and the identity M˜1 = M1 + βE
[
M˜2
∣∣G1], we get(
ǫ2 − βǫ1
ǫ1 − βǫ0
)−γ
= eρ
M˜2
M1
1 + βE
[
M˜2
M1
∣∣Gk−1] .
As in (5.10), this implies that
(5.11)
M˜2
M1
=
e−ρ (ǫ2 − βǫ1)
−γ
(ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ − e−ρβE
[
(ǫ2 − βǫ1)
−γ ∣∣G1] .
Recall that M˜1 = M1 + βE
[
M˜2
∣∣G1]. Therefore, by plugging (5.11) into the pre-
ceding equation and recalling (5.10), we get
M1 + βE
M1 e−ρ (ǫ2 − βǫ1)−γ
(ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ − e−ρβE
[
(ǫ2 − βǫ1)
−γ ∣∣G1]
∣∣∣∣G1
 =
e−ρ (ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ
ǫ−γ0 − βe
−ρE
[
(ǫ1 − βǫ0)
−γ
] ,
proving that
M1 =
α(1)
1 + βE
[
α(2)
∣∣G1] ; M˜2 = α(1)α(2)1 + βE [α(2)∣∣G1] ,
where
(5.12) α(k) :=
e−ρ (ǫk − βǫk−1)
−γ
(ǫk−1 − βǫk−2)
−γ − βe−ρE
[
(ǫk − βǫk−1)
−γ ∣∣Gk−1] ,
for all k = 1, ..., T. Now, assume that for k < T − 1, we have
(5.13) Mk =
α(1)...α(k)∏k+1
j=2
(
1 + βE
[
α(j)
∣∣Gj−1]) .
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Recall that the first order conditions (5.3) combined with the identity M˜k =Mk +
βE
[
M˜k+1
∣∣Gk] implies that
M˜k+1
Mk
1 + βE
[
M˜k+1
Mk
∣∣Gk] = eρ
(
ǫk+1 − βǫk
ǫk − βek−1
)−γ
,
and hence, as in (5.10) and (5.11), we get
M˜k+1
Mk
=
e−ρi (ǫk+1 − βǫk)
−γ
(ǫk − βǫk−1)
−γ − βe−ρiE
[
(ǫk+1 − βǫk)
−γ ∣∣Gk−1] ,
thus we get
(5.14) M˜k+1 =
α(1)...α(k + 1)∏k+1
j=2
(
1 + βE
[
α(j)
∣∣Gj−1]) .
As above, we have
M˜k+2
Mk+1
1 + βE
[
M˜k+2
Mk+1
∣∣Gk+1] = eρi
(
ǫk+2 − βǫk+1
ǫk+1 − βek
)−γ
,
and thus
(5.15)
M˜k+2
Mk+1
=
e−ρi (ǫk+2 − βǫk+1)
−γ
(ǫk+1 − βǫk)
−γ − βe−ρiE
[
(ǫk+2 − βǫk+1)
−γ ∣∣Gk] .
Recall that M˜k+1 = Mk+1+βE
[
M˜k+2
∣∣Gk+1], hence, in virtue of (5.14) and (5.15),
we get
Mk+1 =
α(1)...α(k + 1)∏k+2
j=2
(
1 + βE
[
α(j)
∣∣Gj−1]) ,
proving the validity of a similar identity as in (5.13) for k+ 1. The equality M˜T =
MT asserts that
MT =
α(1)...α(T )∏T
j=2
(
1 + βE
[
α(j)
∣∣Gj−1]) .
Finally, it is not hard to verify that the latter identity and (5.13), k = 1, ..., T − 1
yield (5.8) and (5.9). The proof is complete. 
Remark 5.2. Assume that β = 0. In this case, the sufficient and necessary
conditions (5.6) and (5.7) are satisfied, and thus Mk = e
−ρk (ǫk/ǫ0)
−γ
, for all
k = 0, ..., T .
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5.2. Zero Coupon Bonds and Lucas Tree Equity. In the current subsection,
we compute explicitly the price of a zero coupon bond and the Lucas tree equity,
in the setting of homogenous equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these prices
are increasing convex functions of the habit-formation parameter. For each T ∈
N, consider a sequence of i.i.d random variables X1, ..., XT such that Xk > β +
β1/γe−ρ/γ , P − a.s., for each k = 1, ..., T. Assume that the aggregate endowment
process (ǫk)k=0,...,T is a geometric random walk, i.e., ǫo = 1, and
ǫk = X1, ..., Xk , k = 1, ..., T.
The filtration representing the market is generated by the aggregate endowment
process, i.e., Gk = σ (ǫ1, ..., ǫk) , k = 0, ..., T. Observe that by Remark 5.1, the suffi-
cient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium are satisfied, and thus the SPD
is given by (5.8) and (5.9).
Zero coupon bonds. The price of a zero coupon bond at time k maturing at
time m is defined by
BF (k, n) = E
[
Mn
Mk
∣∣Gk] .
It is not hard to check by using (5.8) and (5.9) that
(5.16) BF (k, n) = e−ρ(n−k)
(
E[X−γ1 ]
)n−k−1
E[(X1 − β)−γ ]
(
1− βe−ρE[X−γ1 ]
)
(1− β/Xk)
−γ − βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
] ,
for all T > n ≥ k > 0,
(5.17) BF (0, n) = e−ρn
(
E[X−γ1 ]
)n−1
E[(X1 − β)−γ ]
(
1− βe−ρE[X−γ1 ]
)
1− βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
] ,
for all T > n ≥ 0,
(5.18) BF (k, T ) = e−ρ(T−k)
(
E[X−γ1 ]
)T−k−1
E[(X1 − β)−γ ]
(1− β/Xk)
−γ − βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
] ,
for all T ≥ k ≥ 1, and
(5.19) BF (0, T ) = e−ρT
(
E[X−γ1 ]
)T−1
E[(X1 − β)−γ ]
1− βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
] .
Observe that asymptotically, the yield of the zero coupon bond BF (0, T ) ignores
the habit-formation coefficient, namely,
lim
T→∞
−
logBF (0, T )
T
= ρ− logE
[
X−γ1
]
.
Let us now examine the qualitative behavior of the zero coupon bond BF (0, T ) as
a function of β, for a fixed time horizon. We fix some β∗ > 0 and assume that
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Xk > β
∗ + (β∗)1/γe−ρ/γ . Note that the zero coupon bond BF (0, T )(β) given by
(5.19) is well defined for all β ∈ [0, β∗]. Furthermore, one can check that
∂
∂β
BF (0, T )(β) =
e−ρT
(
E[X−γ1 ]
)T−1 e−ρ (E [(X1 − β)−γ])2 + γE [(X1 − β)−1−γ](
1− βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
])2 > 0,
and
∂2
∂2β
BF (0, T )(β) =
e−ρT
(
E[X−γ1 ]
)T−1(
1− βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
])2×
{(
1− βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
])(
2γe−ρE[(X1 − β)
−γ ]E[(X1 − β)
−1−γ ]+
γ (1 + γ)E[(X1 − β)
−2−γ ]
)
+ 2
(
e−ρ
(
E[(X1 − β)
−γ ]
)2
+ γE[(X1 − β)
−1−γ ]
)
×
(
e−ρE[(X1 − β)
−γ ] + βγe−ρE[(X1 − β)
−1−γ ]
)}
> 0.
Thus we conclude that the zero coupon bond BF (0, T ) is an increasing convex
function of β.
Example 5.1. Consider a market with T = 1, Ω = {ω1, ω2}, P ({ωi}) = 1/2, for
i = 1, 2, X1(ω1) = 3 and X1(ω2) = 4. The agent is represented by γ = 2, ρ = 0
and the habit-formation coefficient is some parameter β ∈ [0, 1] (that is, β∗ = 1).
As illustrated in Figure 1., the zero coupon bond (which is in fact the interest rate)
viewed as a function of β, is given by
r(β) := BF (0, 1) =
(3− β)−2 + (4− β)−2
2− β ((3 − β)−2 + (4− β)−2)
.
0.22
0.087
β1
r(β)
Figure 1. Dependence of the interest rate on habit-formation.
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Lucas Tree Equity. An asset with a dividend being equal to the aggregate en-
dowment is called the Lucas tree equity. Its price at time k = 0, ..., T is given
by
Sǫ(k,T ) =
T∑
n=k+1
E
[
Mn
Mk
ǫn
∣∣Gk] .
It is not hard to verify by using (5.8) and (5.9) that
(5.20) Sǫ(k,T ) =
T−1∑
n=k+1
eρ−(n−k)
(
E
[
X1−γ1
])n−k−1
(1− β/Xk)
−γ − βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
]×
(
E[X1(X1 − β)
−γ ]− βe−ρE[X1−γ1 ]E[(X1 − β)
−γ ]
)
ǫk+
e−ρ−(T−k)
(
E
[
X1−γ1
])T−k−1
E[X1(X1 − β)−γ ]
(1− β/Xk)
−γ − βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
]ǫk,
for k = 1, ..., T , and
(5.21) Sǫ(0,T ) =
1
1− βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
](eρ 1−
(
e−ρE
[
X1−γ1
])T−1
1− E
[
X1−γ1
] ×
(
E[X1(X1 − β)
−γ ]− βe−ρE[X1−γ1 ]E[(X1 − β)
−γ ]
)
+
e−ρ
(
e−ρE
[
X1−γ1
])T−1
E
[
X1 (X1 − β)
−γ
])
.
Assume that e−ρE
[
X1−γ1
]
< 1, then the long-run Lucas tree equity is given by
Sǫ(0,∞) := lim
T→∞
Sǫ(0,T ) =
E[X1(X1 − β)−γ ]− βe−ρE[X
1−γ
1 ]E[(X1 − β)
−γ ]
1− βe−ρE
[
(X1 − β)
−γ
] eρ
1− E
[
X1−γ1
] .
By a direct computation (similarly as in the case of zero coupon bonds), one can
check that Sǫ(0,∞) is an increasing convex function of the habit-formation parameter
β.
Example 5.2. Consider the same market as in Example 5.1. Note that in this
setting E[X−11 ] = 7/24. Therefore, the long-run Lucas tree equity is finite and
given by (see Figure 2.):
Sǫ(0,∞)(β) =
24
17
(
3− 724β
)
(3 − β)−2 +
(
4− 724β
)
(4 − β)−2
2− β ((3− β)−2 + (4− β)−2)
.
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0.41
0.93
β
Sǫ(0,∞)(β)
1
Figure 2. Dependence of the long-run Lucas tree equity on habit-formation.
5.3. Heterogeneous Economy. By (5.3), the optimal consumption stream of
agent i satisfies
(5.22) cik − βc
i
k−1 = e
−
ρi
γi
k
(
M˜k
M˜0
)− 1
γi
ci0,
for all k = 1, ..., T. We emphasize that the system of equations
(5.23)
N∑
i=1
(
cik − βc
i
k−1
)
= ǫk − βǫk−1,
for k = 0, ..., T (where c−1 := ǫ−1 = 0, i = 1, ..., N), is equivalent to the original
market clearing conditions (5.5), for k = 0, ..., T .
Theorem 5.8. Assume that
(5.24) βǫk < ǫk,
and
(5.25) βE
[
max
j=1,...,N
(ǫk − βǫk−1)
−γj
∣∣Gk−1] < min
j=1,...,N
e−ρj (ǫk−1 − βǫk−2)
−γj ,
for all k = 1, ..., T. Then, there exists an equilibrium.
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Proof of Theorem 5.8. Notice that by (5.22) and (5.23), we can rewrite the
budget constraints (5.5) as
(5.26)
N∑
i=1
M˜
− 1
γi
k e
−
ρi
γi
k
λ
1
γi
i = ǫk − βǫk−1,
for k = 0, ..., T, where λi :=
(
ci0
)γi
M˜0, for i = 1, ..., N. Recall that M˜T = MT . Since
ǫT > βǫT−1, it follows that exists a continuous function gT (λ1, ..., λN ) : R
N
++ →
L2++ (GT ) that uniquely solves the equation
N∑
i=1
g
− 1
γi
T (λ1, ..., λN ) e
−
ρi
γi
T
λ
1
γi
i = ǫT − βǫT−1.
Thus MT = gT (λ1, ..., λN ) is a candidate for a SPD at the maturity date. Recall
that M˜T−1 = MT−1 + βE
[
MT
∣∣GT−1] and consider equation (5.26) for k = T − 1:
(5.27)
N∑
i=1
(
MT−1 + βE
[
gT (λ1, ..., λN )
∣∣GT−1])− 1γi e− ρiγi (T−1)λ 1γii = ǫT−1 − βǫT−2.
Note that for each ω ∈ Ω there exists j(ω) ∈ {1, ..., N} such that
g
− 1
γj(ω)
T (λ1, ..., λN ) (ω)e
−
ρj(ω)
γj(ω)
T
λ
1
γj(ω)
j(ω) ≥
ǫT (ω)− βǫT−1(ω)
N
,
or equivalently
λj(ω)N
γj(ω)e−ρj(ω)T (ǫT (ω)− βeT−1(ω))
−γj(ω) ≥ gT (λ1, ..., λN ) (ω),
which yields
E
[
max
j=1,...,N
λjN
γje−ρjT (ǫT − βT−1)
−γj
∣∣GT−1] ≥ E [gT (λ1, ..., λN ) ∣∣GT−1] .
Therefore, we have
N∑
i=1
(
βE
[
gT (λ1, ..., λN )
∣∣GT−1])− 1γi λ 1γii e− ρiγi (T−1) ≥
N∑
i=1
(
λ−1i βe
ρi(T−1)
)− 1
γi
(
E
[
max
j=1,...,N
λjN
γje−ρjT (ǫT − βT−1)
−γj
∣∣GT−1])− 1γi ≥
N∑
i=1
(
λ−1i βe
ρi(T−1) max
j=1,...,N
λjN
γje−ρjT
)− 1
γi
(
E
[
max
j=1,...,N
(ǫT − βT−1)
−γj
∣∣GT−1])− 1γi .
Let l ∈ {1, ..., N} be such that λlNγleρl(T−1) = maxj=1,...,N λjNγjeρi(T−1). The
preceding inequalities yield
N∑
i=1
(
βE
[
gT (λ1, ..., λN )
∣∣GT−1])− 1γi λ 1γii e− ρiγi (T−1) >
β
− 1
γl e
ρl
γl
(
E
[
max
j=1,...,N
(ǫT − βT−1)
−γj
∣∣GT−1])− 1γl > ǫT−1 − βǫT−2,
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where the last inequality follows from assumption (5.25). Therefore, it follows
that there exists a continuous function gT−1 (λ1, ..., λN ) : R
N
++ → L
2
++ (GT−1) that
solves uniquely the equation:
N∑
i=1
(
gT−1 (λ1, ..., λN ) + βE
[
gT (λ1, ..., λN )
∣∣GT−1])− 1γi e− ρiγi (T−1)λ 1γii =
ǫT−1 − βǫT−2.
Hence, in accordance with (5.27), we set MT−1 = gT−1 (λ1, ..., λN ) to be a can-
didate for a SPD in the period k = T − 1, and M˜T−1 = g˜T−1 (λ1, ..., λN ) :=
gT−1 (λ1, ..., λN ) + E
[
gT (λ1, ..., λN )
∣∣GT−1] is the corresponding perturbed SPD.
Now, one can check by induction that there exists a sequence of continuous functions
g0 (λ1, ..., λN ) , ..., gT (λ1, ..., λN ) and g˜0 (λ1, ..., λN ) , ..., g˜T (λ1, ..., λN ) such that gk(
λ1, ..., λN
)
: RN++ → L
2
++ (Gk), and
g˜k (λ1, ..., λN ) = gk (λ1, ..., λN ) + βE
[
g˜k+1 (λ1, ..., λN )
∣∣Gk] ,
for all k = 1, ..., T − 1, where g˜T (λ1, ..., λN ) := gT (λ1, ..., λN ) , and
(5.28)
N∑
i=1
(g˜k (λ1, ..., λN ))
− 1
γi λ
1
γi
i e
−
ρi
γi
k
= ǫk − βǫk−1,
for all k = 0, ..., T.A candidate for the (non-normalized) SPD isMk = gk (λ1, ..., λN ),
for k = 0, ..., T ; the corresponding perturbed SPD is M˜k = g˜k (λ1, ..., λN ), for
k = 0, ..., T.
We introduce now the so-called excess demand function h := (h1, ..., hN ) :
RN++ → R
N , which is defined by
hi(λ1, ..., λN ) =
1
λi
( T∑
k=0
E
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )
k∑
l=0
βk−le
−
ρi
γi
l
(g˜l (λ1, ..., λN ))
− 1
γi
]
λ
1
γi
i
−
T∑
k=0
E
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )ǫ
i
k
] )
,
for i = 1, ..., N. Observe that by (5.22), an appropriate candidate for the optimal
consumption stream is cik =
∑k
l=0 β
k−le
−
ρi
γi
l
(g˜l (λ1, ..., λN ))
− 1
γi λ
1
γi
i . Furthermore,
note that in order to get an equilibrium, it is left to check that the budget con-
straints (5.2) are satisfied for the candidates of the SPD constructed above. Con-
sequently, it suffices to prove that there exists a vector (λ∗1, ..., λ
∗
N ) ∈ R
N
++ such
that hi(λ
∗
1, ..., λ
∗
N ) = 0, for all i = 1, ..., N. To this end, it is sufficient to check
that the following properties are satisfied (by a standard fixed-point argument as
in Theorem 17.C.1 in Mas-Colell et al. [19]):
(1) Each function hi, i = 1, ..., N is homogeneous of degree 0 (i.e., hi(tλ1, ..., tλN ) =
hi(λ1, ..., λN ), for all (λ1, ..., λN ) ∈ RN++ and t > 0). This follows from the fact
that gk, k = 0, ..., T and g˜k, k = 0, ..., T, are homogeneous of degree 1 (i.e.,
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gk(tλ1, ..., tλN ) = tgk(λ1, ..., λN ), and g˜k(tλ1, ..., tλN ) = tg˜k(λ1, ..., λN ), for all
(λ1, ..., λN ) ∈ RN++ and t > 0).
(2) The equation
∑N
i=1 λihi(λ1, ..., λN ) = 0 holds for all (λ1, ..., λN ) ∈ R
N
++. This
is satisfied by the market clearing condition.
(3) Each function hi, i = 1, ..., N is continuous in R
N
++. The assertion follows
from the fact that the functions gk, k = 0, ..., T and g˜k, k = 0, ..., T are continuous.
(4) Each function hi, i = 1, ..., N is bounded in above and limλi→0 hi (λ1, ..., λN ) =
−∞. First, we claim that
(5.29) lim
λi→0
−
1
λi
T∑
k=0
E
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )ǫ
i
k
]
= −∞.
Note that by (5.28), we have
g˜k(λ1, ..., λN ) ≥ λje
−ρjk (ǫk − βǫk−1)
−γj ,
for all k = 0, ..., T and j = 1, ..., N. In particular, we have
gT (λ1, ..., λN ) = g˜T (λ1, ..., λN ) ≥ λje
−ρjT (ǫT − βǫT−1)
−γj ,
for all j = 1, ..., N , hence,
gT (λ1, ..., λN ) ≥
1
N
N∑
j=1
λje
−ρjT (ǫT − βǫT−1)
−γj .
Consider the random variable K := 1N minj=1,...,N (ǫT − βǫT−1)
−γj e−ρjT . We have
gT (λ1, ..., λN ) ≥ K
N∑
j=1
λj ,
and thus
(5.30) −
1
λi
T∑
k=0
E
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )ǫ
i
k
]
≤ −
1
λi
E
[
gT (λ1, ..., λN )ǫ
i
T
]
≤
−E
[
KǫiT
] ∑Nj=1 λj
λi
,
proving (5.29).
First case: 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1. First observe that
βk−lE
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )
∣∣Gl] ≤ g˜l(λ1, ..., λN ),
for all l = 0, ..., k. Thus
(5.31)
T∑
k=0
E
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )
k∑
l=0
βk−l (g˜l (λ1, ..., λN ))
− 1
γi
]
λ
1
γi
−1
i ≤
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T∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
E
[
(g˜l (λ1, ..., λN ))
1− 1
γi
]
λ
1
γi
−1
i .
By (5.28), we have (g˜k(λ1, ..., λN ))
− 1
γi λ
1
γi
i e
−
ρi
γi
k
≤ ǫk − βǫk−1 for all k = 0, ..., T,
and since 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1, it follows that
λ
1
γi
−1
i (g˜k(λ1, ..., λN ))
1− 1
γi ≤ eρik(1/γi−1) (ǫk − βǫk−1)
1−γi ,
and thus
T∑
k=0
E
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )
k∑
l=0
βk−l (g˜l (λ1, ..., λN ))
− 1
γi
]
λ
1
γi
−1
i ≤
T∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
eρil(1/γi−1)E
[
(ǫl − βǫl−1)
1−γi
]
,
proving that hi is bounded in above, since the second term is negative. Further-
more, by (5.29) it follows that limλi→0 hi (λ1, ..., λN ) = −∞.
Second case: γi > 1. Note that for every k = 0, ..., T and ω ∈ Ω, there exists
an index j := j(ω) ∈ {1, ..., N} such that
(g˜k(λ1, ..., λN )(ω))
− 1
γj λ
1
γj
j > e
ρi
γi
k ǫk(ω)− βǫk−1(ω)
N
,
or equivalently(
N (ǫk(ω)− βǫk−1(ω))
−1
)γj
e−ρjkλj > g˜k(λ1, ..., λN )(ω),
therefore (since γi > 1), we have(
N (ǫk(ω)− βǫk−1(ω))
−1
)γj(1− 1γi )
e
−
(
1− 1
γi
)
ρjkλ
(
1− 1
γi
)
j > (g˜k(λ1, ..., λN )(ω))
1− 1
γi .
Set
K ′ := max
i,j=1,...,N ;k=0,...,T
(
N (ǫk(ω)− βǫk−1(ω))
−1
)γj(1− 1γi )
e
−
(
1− 1
γi
)
ρjk.
We have
(g˜k(λ1, ..., λN ))
1− 1
γi ≤ K ′λ
1− 1
γi
j < K
′
 N∑
j=1
λj
1− 1γi .
Therefore, as in (5.31), we get
hi(λ1, ..., λN ) ≤
1
λi
( T∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
E
[
(g˜l (λ1, ..., λN ))
1− 1
γi
]
λ
1
γi
i
−
T∑
k=0
E
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )ǫ
i
k
])
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≤
1
λi
( T∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
E [K ′]
 N∑
j=1
λj
1− 1γi λ 1γii − T∑
k=0
E
[
gk(λ1, ..., λN )ǫ
i
k
])
≤
T∑
k=0
k∑
l=0
E [K ′]βk−l
 N∑
j=1
λj
λi
1−
1
γi
− E
[
KǫiT
] N∑
j=1
λj
λi
,
where the last inequality follows from (5.30). Therefore, we get limλi→0 hi (λ1, ..., λN ) =
−∞. From other hand, each function of the form x 7→ x
1− 1
γi −x is bounded in above
on the interval (0,∞). Hence, the function hi (λ1, ..., λN ) is bounded in above, and
the proof of Theorem 5.8 is accomplished. 
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